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THESIS

THE LIABILITY OF AN AGENT SIGNING NEGOTIABLE PAPER

-- BY--

AARON JOSEPH COLNON

CORNELL UNIVERSITY -- SCHOOL OF LAW

1894

Probably there

is no question in law to-day which

has called forth more opinions by eminent

judges or

arguments from more able lawyers than the question as to

the liability of an agent signing or purporting to sign

for a principal, and it

is certain that no question has

been more differently and, in my humble opinion, less

satisfactorily answered.

It has in fact been answered

differently in many of the states, and in some one can

scarcely tell

even now what the law

is,

so many opinions

differing in each particular having been handed down by

each succeeding judge on the same bench.

This

is particularly true in regard to the presump-

tions raised by law as to the liability

signing a negotiable

of a person

instrument as agent for another.
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As one learned judge says, "The books are full of cases

on this refined subject and are overburdened with

elaborate learning not infrequently more nice than wise,

and show such embarrassing conflict of judicial opinion

that one in search of the law is well nigh tempted to

discard the whole that is wriuten and follow the dictates

of his own understanding."

This is the subject

I in-

tend to discuss and particularly the liability of one

signing for a

corporation.

In the first place,

I think all the courts have from

the beginning laid down rules altogether too strict and

arbitrary as to the liabilities of those persons.

reason, it seems to me,

The

is the fact that written con-

tracts were originally all formal and later when mercan-

tile contracts began to be in writing, although there was

an effort, and in fact

extent,

it was successful,

to be more lenient

to a certain

and do away with a

large part

of the formality of the old contracts under seal and thus

broaden their

or

usefulness,

less of the

yet the

courts have retained more

law of those instruments especially with

regard to negotiable

instruments.

The two are yet much alike and in some ways to the

advantage of business usages, but in regard to the lia-

bility of agents the rule is

U. S. Bank vs.

too strict.

In the case of

Lyman, 20 Vt. 666, Prentiss J. says,:

"Upon the whole it appears to me that the true rule of

law is

that no person,

partner,

fact a principal

can sue or be sued upon a bill

note, unless he appear

it.

although in

or

or negotiable

upon its face to be a party to

A promissory note,according to the expression of

very great judges, partakes in some manner of the nature

of a specialty importing a consideration and creating a

debt or duty by its own proper force.

and passing by mere indorsement,

it

Being assignable

is necessary that the

parties to it should appear and be known by bare in-

spection of the writing, for it

names appearing upon it that

it

is on the credit of the

obtains circulation.

It is for these qualities and on these considerations

that

is distinguished from simple contracts in general

it

and made

subj ect to a

rule."

different

This statement

expresses exactly the reason given for this rule by

But on a closer

judges and text writers.

this exactly true

persons

In

the

?

Is

it always on the credit of the

named in

the paper

that it

of a

bank or a

large

case

examination is

obtains

?

circulation

corporation,

this

is

Then how does

certainly not general]y so.

circulation ?

it

obtain

Not because the cashier is a responsible

man personally but because he represents some one who is,

and the signer

is known to be

the authorized agent.

Any

corporation business has to be carried on through an

agent and when paper is accepted from him in the regular

course of the corporate business, it seems absurd to

assume

that he intended to give his personal note or

that it was accepted as such.

In the state

the very strict rule as to negotiable

of

Iowa

instruments pre-

vails, but recognizing the injustice of a strict en-

forcement

of the same,

the court has found a means of'

modifying it, till it can almost be said that no such

rule exists.

shown in

The ground

on which this

the case of Lee vs.

Percival,

is done

is well

52 N.W.Rep.543.

A note was given to plaintiff

in the ordinary course of

the business of the Herndon Natural Gas and Land Company,

signed F.

A.

Percival,

President,

Suit was brought against

Alex Hastie,

the signers,

but

Secretary.

they alleged

that if it was so signed that it was not the obligation

of the Company only, the manner of signing it was the

result of a mutual mistake, and asked that

it be reformed

and made to express the true contract of the parties.

This was allowed by the Court of Equity, Judge Robinson

saying, "It

is well settled in this State that a signa-

ture like those in

ally

title

liable,

question,

renders

the signer individu-

the addition of words denoting an official

being deemed a mere description of the person.

is also the rule that parol evidence is not admissible

to show

that such a signature was designed to bind the

It

corporation of which the person signing was an officer,

but that has no application to actions in equity where

the signature is alleged to be the result of a mistake

the correction of which is asked."

This plainly arrives at a just and fair interpreta-

tion but why should it be necessary to resort to a mere

technicality when the instrument could be interpreted

just as well in a court of law without the necessity of

having a technical reformation in a court of equity ?

It seems to me that the strictness of the rule at

common law in regard to the mode of execution extends

only to solemn instruments under seal.

It does not reach

unsolemn instruments and especially commercial and mari-

time contracts.

In regard to these the liability of

the principal is made to depend upon the fact that the

act was done in

exercise and within the bounds

powers delegated and especially that

of the parties

that the principal

should be bound and in

was the

intent

and not the agent

ascertaining

nected with the execution of a

it

of the

these facts

as con-

written instrument

it

should be held that parol testimony should be admissible

to prove who is the principal.

the older

states,

except Maine,

New York and nearly all

do allow that as far as

the original parties and those acquainted with the cir-

cuinstances are

concerned,

the principal,

while Maine and some western

it

is

allowable to show who

states

is

allow

no parol evidence to be introduced to make any one re-

sponsible whose name does not appear on the face of the

instrument, in most of which

and equitable that

cases it would be most just

it should be done.

But with regard to third parties who hold without

knowledge of the facts, the courts seem universal in ap-

plying a strict rule governing the liability of an agent,

and in

order to relieve himself from liability

unequivocally make it

he must

appear on the face of the note

that he signs for another and no extrinsic evidence is

allowed under any circumstances

should this

be so ?

Bigelow

to

says

Why

show otherwise.

: "A

person is

con-

structively given notice" of equities when he has knowl-

-

edge of a preliminary fact or

suggest

set of facts which would

to the average man the existence of some ulterior

fact of importance.

The preliminary fact puts him on

inquiry concerning the probable ulterior fact.

If he

does not pursue the inquiry suggested, or if he pursues

it

faithlessly,

he is

fixed with notice

of it.

He stands

10

as if he knew it."
Why should not this rule apply when the addition of

cashier, agent, etc. is put to a person's signature

when it is the universal custom among both banks and

business men to accept such a signature as that of the

principal ?

Yet plainly from many cases it is seen that

though an agent signing in that manner did not intend

to bind himself or that the person taking the note never
expected him to, yet he is held liable.

This first per-

son should certainly not be able to get any better se-

curity than he bargained for, simply because the person

signing instead of writing the whole thing out abbreviated it in such a way that they and any business man of

ordinary intelligence would understand what the abbrevia-

tion stood for.

Why should not a third person taking

the note be considered to have constructive notice just

the same ?

The words President, agent, etc. must mean

something.

If

he does not know what

should he not find out ?

an addition is just

they mean,

The law says though that such

intended as a description and is

understood as such by holders of the note,

not reasonable.

no one except

ject

why

The iact,on

one who is

ever understood it

But

the other hand,is

versed in

the law of

to be intended as a

that is

that

this sub-

description,

and if they do not understand it that way, why should

the law presume

that

they do ?

In

case of Hodgson vs.

Dexter(l Cranch,264) John Marshall C.J. very aptly said

where the defendant had entered into a contract as agent

and described himself as

of the defendant

is

such,

stated in

"The

official

the description

character

of the

parties.

This it has been said might be occasioned by

a willingness

in the defendant

to describe himself by a

high and honorable title he then filled.

This unques-

tionably is possible but

construction

is

not the fair

to be placed on this part of the contract, becuase it

is

not usual for gentlemen

in

their

private concerns

to exhibit themselves in their official character."

3ut this

such a

is

not the general

signature and though it

for me to criticise

eminent

grounds,

what has

of judges,

first,

that

is

construction put upon

rather presumptuous

been laid

nevertheless,

down by the most

I do criticise

on the

no man should be able through a

technical rule of law to get more or less than he bar-

gained for;

second, it is a usage of business which is

almost universal for an agent to

sign paper

which

the law

would say bound him and yet

himself or the persons

he did not

intend to bind

through whose hands

it

passes did

not think of him as principal, in fact, in many cases

if

they had they would not have accepted the paper

;

third, a person taking negotiable paper should be pre-

sumed to have notice of this the same as

when there

gest

such a

is

other

anything on the face of the paper

equities

to sug-

thing to an ordinary person.

Nevertheless,

this reasoning has certainly not been

followed by most of the courts and though some cases

seem to have been decided

in

accord with it,

others,

and

in fact most of them, though not overruling, have found

aome distinguishing feature and ruled otherwise

; and

in fact the courts seem tending all the while to a more

strict

interpretation

of the

contract

as evinced on the

14
face of tha negotiable instrument, while the doctrine of

the lenient interpretation of many of the older cases is

being discarded.

The old case of Mechanics Bank vs. Bank of Columbia,

5 Wharton 326, might be cited to illustrate how far the

courts have departed from old rules.

The note read

"Mechanics Bank of Alexandria,July 121817.

Cashier of Branch Bank of the United States,Washington :--

Pay to the order of Phillip H. Minor amount of

discount made me,which I believe is seventeen thousand
six hundred and twenty-six dollars and five cents.
(Signed)

Wm. Patton,Jun."

Here wdthout a word on the face of the note as

to who

was the principal, it was allowed to be proved that

Patton was simply cashier, acting as agent for the Bank.

The Judge

in his opinion said that" there would not be the

least

question as

pal if

to whether he could be tried

the agent had put Cas.

that as there was nothing

true,

as

contended

in

to

or Ca.

after

show it,

it

the argument,

that

as princi-

his name,

is

but

by no means

the acts

of the

agent derive their validity from professing on the face

of them to have been done in

the exercise of the agency.

In the more solemn exercise of derivative powers as ap-

plied to the execution of instruments

mon law,

rules

the diversified

the liability

(1

the

That

known to the corn-

of form have been prescr~ied.

exercise

of the duties of a

of the principal

the acts were done in

But in

agent

general

depends upon the facts

the exercise and(2

limits of the powers delegated.

:

Within

These facts are

necessarily inquirable into by a court and jury and this

inquiry is not confined to written instruments."

Again in

(1 Wallace,

approval

the case of Baldwin vs.

234)

the Judge

and went

Bank of Newbury,

cited the previous

to the extent

in

case with

speaking of parol

evidence being admitted to prove whether

the person

signing a negotiable paper was acting as agent or prin-

cipal, of saying "The same rule as applied to ordinary

simple

contracts has since that time (time of decision in

Mechanics Bank vs. Bank of Columbia above) been fully

adopted by this

The latest

States Court

court."

case on this

question in

the United

is Metcalf vs. Williams 104,U.S.

was a draft in this form

93.

It

:

"Alexandria, Va.,Oct. 2, 1875.
The First National Bank of Alexandria,Va.,pay to
the order of A.E. & C. E. Tilton,Seven Thousand Dollars.
(Signed)

EP.Aistrop,Sec.

W.G.Williams,V.Pres."

Judge Bradley said : "Where a person acts merely as

agent of another and signs papers in

is,

signs them as agent and the party

that

capacity,

that

with whom he deals

has full knowledge of his agency and of the principal

for whom he acts

an

express disclosure of the princi-

pals named on the face of the papers or in

is

the signature

not essential to protect the agent from personal

He further says,

liability".

termine whether the form of

sufficient

ficial

dent,

character.

is unnecessary to de-

the document

to charge innocent

notice of its

"It

in

this

case was

holders of the check with

The fact

that it bore two of-

signatures, that of the complainant as Vice Presi-

and Aistrop as Secretary, is so unusual on the hy-

pothesis of its being an individual transaction, and

points so distinctly to an official origin, that it may

be very doubtful whether any could claim to

be ignorant

of its true character."

This case goes farther in the right directi6n of jut

tice and according to business usages than any other late

case that I have been able to find, and it is to be re-

For

gretted that the last point was not involved.

though he ends up by admitting that

is that the adding of agent

the

ordinary rule

or some like term is only a

descriptio personae and would have no weight except with

persons acquainted with the circumstances.

Still

I thin

think that where paper was signed in that way and passed

through the hands of business men in the ordinary course

of business if it was to come before a federal court,

the

court would go very far in taking into consideration the

business usages and the meaning

an ordinary man would

give

to such an addition.

If

a

court would do this,

there would certainly be a strong tendency to raise a

presumption of law that notice had been given, for al-

though many learned judges have said that such additions

are meant and understood to mean simply a description of

the person, Judge Bradley's opinion would lead one to

think that

to

the court would not necessarily keep rigidly

that rule.

The strongest argument

pretation, I think,

is

for

the strict

rule of inter-

that a negotiable

instrument

is

used in a greater or less degree as a circulating medium

and as such should be as free from all

conditions and un-

certainties as possible so as to fulfill in the highest

degree

this

mission.

As one learned Judge puts

it,

"A negotiable instrunent is like a traveler without

20
luggage. "

But why should this be necessarily so ?

There are

many things on a negotiable instrument which the law pre-

sunes gives notice to a holder which are much more unjust

and which do not have to appear on the face of the paper

even as clearly as this does in order to be presumed to

have given constructive notice.

effect that

An old rule was

to the

if a note endorsed in blank was offered for

discount by an entire stranger, was dicounted without any

inquiry being made concerning this stranger, and it turn-

ed out that

the note had been stolen or

obtained fraud-

ulently, the Bank who discounted could not recover, and

these principles although denied for many years by the

courts, seem to be recognized again to a certain extent

in the late New York case of Vosburgh vs. Diefendorf,

119 N. Y.,

357.

Why should not an acceptor

ident,

of a note bearing Pres-

Treasurer, or some like term after the signature,

be put upon inquiry as to the meaning of these words,

he does not already know what

if

they are intended for, and

if he does know why not be bound by them.

If

this rule was adopted there would be no

to any person.

The paper would be in

harder to circulate, but the

the maker,

and when a

injustice

many instances

inconvenience would fall

person finds an inconvenience

on

in

doing a certain thing, he generally inquires into the

cause, and if it is not too much labor he remedies

it.

This would be done by the maker of a note if it was

found that

worth less.

it did not circulate as well

Of course

it

and was therefore

could be said that under

the

present law if an agent has

to pay one of his notes once,

he will probably afterwards know how to make one

will bind

his principal.

way to learn and in

and since negotiable

kinds

But that

is

most cases a very

a pretty

which

hard

inequitable way,

instruments are drawn up by all

of people educated and uneducated in the laws,

they should receive a liberal interpretation and not

adapted to those instruments which all

themselves not learned

in

one

persons admit

the law enough to make and

therefore leave to professional men to draw up.

Nevertheless, the administrators of justice have

not seen fit as yet to look at it this way but have laid

down much stricter rules in most of the states and in

England.

In New York there have been many cases decided on

the points in question, and the law, at

least, for the

present, is well settled that a bona fide holder can

look to the agent for payment of the note if he has not

clearly shown on the face that he acts as agent and not

as principal.

Just what the court has decided is suf-

ficient to show this has been up many times,

has been answered

ly.

Even as

in

different

cases somewhat

to whether it can be shown

evidence who is the principal

instrument.

different-

to cases between the original parties there

has been much litigation as

by parol

though, and

But

in a negotiable

that question, I think, has been dis-

posed of in the interests of justice and equity, and the

law is to-day that an agent can show by parol evidence

at all

times between himself and the payee of the note,

the circumstances

under which and understanding

between

them as

to the capacity in which he signed.

One of the oldest

cases to be found in lew York

State directly on this point is the case of Taft vs.

Brewster, 9 Johnson, 334.

A Bond was given by

A.B.&C. as trustees of the Baptist society of Richfield,

for a certain amount of money and signed "A.B.C.,

Trustees of Baptist Society, of Richfield" and sealed by

their private seals, held that they were indepentently

liable.

The opinion is given per

Curiam with no reason

for the decision and not a single case cited.

This was

a very arbitrary ruling, it seems to me, or else the

court was very much influenced by the rules governing

other contracts in writing, and since at

(1812) all

that

early time

contracts in writing were construed with much

the strictness of sealed instruments, it is not at all

singular that

contract

the true distinction between an ordinary

in writing and a negotiable note was

to a cer-

tain extent overlooked and the note treated as any other

contract ; yet it is unfortunate since this

case is

cited

continually in later cases as settling the law forever

on this point.

The fact that Judges and lawyers generally did not

distinguish contracts in the form of negotiable instru-

ments from others in writing is plainly seen in the ear-

ly cases,

for continually cases of ordinary written con-

tract

cited in

are

these old cases both by the attorneys

and by the judges on points as to an agent's ability to t

bind his principal

in a negotiable

versa, and in not one of them is

instrument

andi vice

it intimated that there

is a difference between their liabilities.

The case of Pentz vs. Stanton, 10 Wendall, 271,

is

a good example showing this and is cited continually in

later cases.

drew a bill

The agent

of exchange

W. A. Pentz, Agent.

It

of a manufacturing establishment

on a

was

third

person signing

held that the

it

principal

could not be charged as the word "agent" was only a word

of description.

Judge Sutherland in the opinion says

"The import and legal effect

of a written instrument

must be gathered from the terms in which it is expressed

and this note must be considered as a separate security.

-No
person in making a contract is considered to

be the agent of another unless

he stipulates for his

principal by name stating his agency in the instrument

which'he signs, nor do I know an instance in the books

of an attempt

to charge the person as the maker of a

written contract appearing to be signed by another unless

the signer professed to act by procuration or authority

and stated the same

of the principal on whose behalf

he gave his signature.

He also discusses at length

the question of the admissibility of parol

evidence in

such cases to show the real character of the transaction

and holds

it

to be utterly

incompetent.

So that he

practically decides that there must appear on the face

of the paper who is

This cases

the principal.

is cited continually on the question of

an agent's liability signing negotiable papers, yet

is

perfectly

plain

that as to written

instruments

it

gener-

ally it states 'the law wrong, for it can now always be

shown by parol

written

evidence,

instruments

who

is

the principal

not under seal,

and since

in

all

it

bases

its rulings at to the agent's liability in this particu-

lar instance on a wrong premise, why should the conclu-

sion arrived at be cited in support of later cases ?

It

is not

intimated by a single word in the opinion that

a negotiable note stands on any different

any other instrument

ground than

in writing, and no distinction

seems to have been made until

much later

cases.

The law as to the admissibility of parol evidence

to show

has

who is the principal to a written contract

changed,

though,

and it

now,

as

I said above,

allows

to be shown by parol who are the real parties to the

contract.

This is also allowed between the original

parties or a person holding and knowing

the circumstances

under which a negotiable instrument was given.

the courts have not yet gone to

But

the extent of saying

29
that a person taking receives constructive notice where

it does not plainly on its face show who is the princi-

pal,

The first

case in

this state holding that a third

person with notice of the circumstances of the drawing

of the paper could not recover from the agent

of Hicks vs. Hinde,

draft

9 Barbour 528.

is that

The agent drew a

on his principal and signed it "Hinde,agent";

the

draft was accepted by the third person with knowledge of

the circumstances.

proved by parol

Held that this knowledge

could be

evidence and that Hinde was not

liable

on

the draft.

The

19 N. Y.,

case of the Bank of Genessee vs. Patchin Bank,

312, is in this

cashier of a

same line.

bank sent to the plaintiff

Here S.

B.

Stokes,

to be discounted

in-

a bill of exchange payable to "S. B. Stokes, cash",

dorsed by him with the same addition

and inclosed

signed "S.

vised at

in

a

letter

B. Stokes,

dated at

cash".

to his signature

the banking house and

the time of discounting

the bill

that

was the cashier and that he had been directed

it

in for discount.

indorsement

of

It

of S.

B.

Stokes

to send

was here held that it

tne Bank and not

ad-

Bank was

The plaintiff

was the

Stokes individu-

ally, because agency of the cashier was communicated to

the knowledge of the plaintiff as well as apparent,

it

is

and

intimated that no other construction could be put

on the bill

under any circumstances,

struction given in the, letter.

else could

even without

Gray,

J.

says,

in-

"What

with any good reason be inferred from his

indorsement of the bill

as

cashier,

inclosed

as it

was

in a letter dated at the Patchin Bank,
cashier,

than that the whole business was done in his

Clearly nothing else

capacity as cashier of the Bank."

could be inferred.

But I

why anything more can be

at

fail

utterly

myself to see

inferred from a letter dated

the Patchin Bank with the addition of "Cash" to a

person's name,

than from a draft,

dated and signed in

a

subscribed as

letter

and after

thought

fills

for

note or something else

the same manner.

A person writes

his narie adds"agent",

a moment

to be the principal,

out a note or a

draft

in

certainly no logical

Justice Gray further

not

yet when he

the same way,

sumed to have meant that he signed as

There is

he is

he is

pre-

the principal.

reason for the distinction.

says,

"If

cashier was a mere description of

the addition of

the person and not

of

the

tiffs

character

in

whicti he acted for

acquired no title

fendant.

Suppose

a

to

the bill

controversy

the Bank,

as against

that

the de-

to have arisen between

the Patchen Bank and the plaintiff, as to

the bill, no one,

the plain-

the title of

I apprehend, would seriously insist

its indorsement by Stokes, with the addition of

cashier, did not

pass

the title,

clearly if it would

be an official act binding upon the Bank in one

it is in the other, and if

case,

it was not intended to make

the Bank liable, the indorsement should have been without

recourse".

But the Justice after g:oing so far in a reasonable

way seems to have considered a little and adds in the

next sentence a qualification to this--- what he probably

thought too broad statement

to be consistent with some of

the earlier

cases---

to the effect

that

there

is

a dis-

tinction between Bank's notes

and drafts and those of

another kind of corporation.

But this,

is not at all just.

in my opinion,

If the cashier of a Bank whose very

business is that of discounting notes,

etc. is able to

bind the corporation and leave himself free from liabili-

ty, how much greater reason is

agent of another corporation,

of bills

and notes is

there for allowing an

whose knowledge

of the law

presumably much less than that of a

cashier, to be able to bind his principal when he

to, just the same

intends

as the cashier of a bank, and in his

endeavor to do so what form of note or draft could he

with more reason follow than that of a person whose very

business

Or

in

is the filling out and accepting of such paper.?

other words,

why should a

cashier be allowed

to

fill

out a paper in

this way and escape personal

liabili-

ty and then turn around and accept paper from an agent

of another corporation signed in

hold him personally liable ?

the same way,

There is

ever on which to distinguish the

hold a

cashier more strictly

liable

and yet

no ground what-

two unless

it be to

than the agent of

another corporation.

But it is unnecessary to discuss more cases on this

point as the law in this state plainly is,

that generally

the addition to a signature of "agent","Pres.",

etc.

"Cashier"

is merely a descriptio personae, and means nothing

by itself unless

it

is shown that

the holder of the note

knew the circumstances under which it was made.

It was even held in the C. N. Bank vs.

Clark, 139

N. Y. 307, that where a note was made out on a blank

form, with the name ol

tne corporation on the margin and

signed "John Clark, Pres.",

bind

"E.H. Close,Treas."

they would

thanselves personally, although they never so in-

tended and the person to whom the note was made out did

not

take it

as theirs.

But he discounted it at a

Bank and as the court held that there was not

the face of the note to give notice,

enough on

the unfortunate

agents had to pay.

Nothing, in my opinion, could be more unjust and

though there may be many reasons for keeping negotiable

paper distinct

yet

fran other written

I think that

and in

contracts

they would lose none of

a very great majority of cases,

in

many ways,

their usefulness

would be more

conducive to justive, if the law presumed a constructive

notice to be given when a person added, "Presl,"Treas.,"

or some such title

to his signature,

which any ordinary

prudent man would be apt to inquire about.

Of course that

ful,

but

if

circulate

it

particular

paper mi 5-ht

was less useful

it

be less use-

would be harder

and those who wished to circulate

it

to

would very

soon find the reason why and remedy it.

Thus no one

would su-f fer hardship but

it,

only a

just

But

those deserving

and they

amount.

it

is

hardly likely

will

this be the law,

this

ruling

this

country and in

times slow,

even if

that for years

it

ever is,

to come,

so firmly has

been established by successive judges in

is

England,

but justice

not the less sure in

though many

courts

of law;

so in

this case surely sooner or later the injustice of the

present ruling will be seen and remedied.

